Combinatory Logic: Volume I by Haskell B. Curry, Robert Feys, William Craig, A. Heyting, A.

By Haskell B. Curry, Robert Feys, William Craig, A. Heyting, A. Robinson

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By Haskell B. Curry, Robert Feys, William Craig, A. Heyting, A. Robinson

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And: “We saw that a rule, properly speaking, is not a rule unless it lives in behavior . . Linguistically we always operate within a framework of living rules. To talk about rules is to move outside the talked-about rules into another framework of living rules . . In attempting to grasp rules as rules from without, we are trying to have our cake and eat it. To describe rules is to describe the skeletons of rules. A rule is lived, not described” (1971, p. 299; p. 315). 22 This reading of Sellars texts forms one of the many points of disagreement between the influential readings offered by John McDowell and Robert Brandom.

17 Sellars focuses his energy on trying to avoid the first 16That conception itself was argued against by Sellars as ultimately requiring a kind of direct apprehension of meanings and rules that is itself unintelligible (or at least is impossible to square with a scientific view of the world). See Sellars’s (1953, p. 337): “There is nothing to a conceptual apparatus that is not determined by its rule, and there is no such thing as choosing these rules to conform with antecedently apprehended universals and connexions, for the ‘apprehension of universals and connexions’ is already the use of a conceptual frame, and as such presupposes the rules in question.

There is no need to decline Sellars’s second hurdle. We simply need to adopt a different posture when we jump it” (McDowell forthcoming-b, pp. 13-14). 40 Terry Pinkard subjectivity (in effect, dissolving it, seeing it as a kind of illusion, a distorted version of the truly objective). That is certainly not Sellars’s intention. It is another story altogether, but part of the project of “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind” is to introduce a notion of “inner episodes” (that is, thoughts) which, although modeled on “outer behavior” (in other words, on speaking and communicating in language), can nonetheless become the objects of a kind of non-inferential knowledge.

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